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CHOICE OF LAW IN TAKINGS CASES

THOMAS W. MERRILL*
ABSTRACT
This Article considers what law should apply in resolving subsidiary questions that arise in the course of deciding takings cases under
federal constitutional law. It argues that there are three choices: federal constitutional law, state law, or a federal-patterning definition
that lays down certain general parameters as a matter of federal
constitutional law but otherwise follows state law if it is consistent
with these parameters. The article illustrates these choices by considering a recent Supreme Court decision, Murr v. Wisconsin,1 which
held that the horizontal dimensions of a “parcel of land” should be
determined, for takings purposes, as a matter of federal constitutional law. It argues that the wholesale federalization of the issue
in this context was misguided. A better solution would be to adopt a
federal-patterning definition of “parcel,” which would largely resolve
the issue by looking to applicable state law unless affirmative evidence shows that parcel boundaries have been manipulated to manufacture a takings claim.
INTRODUCTION
Stewart Sterk has been a relatively lonely voice in arguing that takings cases should be resolved with greater attention to the role of
state law.2 I agree with him that state law has been ignored too
often. I would like to use this occasion to address one dimension of the
state-versus-federal-law question in takings jurisprudence. Specifically, I will consider whether subsidiary questions that arise in adjudicating takings claims should be resolved as a matter of federal
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to the participants at the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at William & Mary Law School
and the Property Works in Progress Conference at Boston University School of Law, both in
the fall of 2018, for the helpful comments.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
2. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203 (2004); see also James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of
Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35 (2016); Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal
Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (2006).
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constitutional law, state law, or some combination of federal and
state law. Because the right in question appears in the Federal
Constitution, federal constitutional law cannot be ignored. At the
same time, the subject of the right—private property—is generally
defined and protected by state law, suggesting that state law should
also play a role. The solution in many contexts, I will argue, is a
federal-patterning definition: a federal constitutional articulation of
how the question should broadly be resolved, leaving the specific details to be filled in as a matter of state law. I will illustrate the
relevant choices and offer an example of how the federal-patterning
definition might work by considering a recent Supreme Court decision, Murr v. Wisconsin, which held that the horizontal dimensions
of a “parcel of land” should be determined, for takings purposes, as
a matter of federal constitutional law.3 I will argue that wholesale
federalization of the issue in this context was misguided. A better
solution would be to adopt a federal-patterning definition of “parcel,”
which would largely resolve the issue by looking to applicable state
law unless affirmative evidence shows that parcel boundaries have
been manipulated to manufacture a takings claim.
I. STATE VERSUS FEDERAL LAW: THREE OPTIONS
Let me begin by broadly framing what I regard to be the relevant
inquiry. The Takings Clause, whether it applies to traditional eminent
domain or to regulatory takings claims, protects “private property.”4
The Takings Clause, of course, is part of the Federal Constitution
and as such, has been held to apply to both the federal government
and the states. So the right in question is one established by federal
constitutional law. Private property, which is the object of the right
established by the Clause, is primarily governed by state law. Indeed,
the Supreme Court is fond of quoting the line from Board of Regents
v. Roth that says property interests are “not created by the Constitution” but rather “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.”5 So the Takings Clause presents a situation in
3. 137 S. Ct. 1933.
4. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
5. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). For repetitions of the
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which the Federal Constitution creates a right protecting an entitlement that is primarily created and defined by state law. This means
the doctrine developed under the Takings Clause must inevitably
delineate, in some fashion, the respective roles of federal and state
law in protecting the constitutional right.
Perhaps the most obvious problem of delineation occurs when
there is some dispute about whether the interest to be protected constitutes “private property” within the meaning of the Takings Clause.
Cases presenting this issue are relatively uncommon.6 The most
recent skirmishes of prominence involved cases that presented the
question whether interest earned on client funds deposited with a
lawyer is the private property of the client for takings purposes.7
(The Court held that the answer is “yes.”8)
I have previously argued that cases presenting this type of question should not be resolved by asking what sorts of rights and privileges are classified as “private property” as a matter of state law.9
Insofar as the quotation from Board of Regents v. Roth suggests that
this is how courts should proceed, it is misleading. Instead, it is necessary to have some federal constitutional conception of the kinds of
interests that qualify as “private property” in order to decide which
entitlements are protected by the Takings Clause. I have called this
a federal constitutional “patterning definition” of private property.10
Armed with the relevant patterning definition, courts can then canvas a state’s law to see if it recognizes an interest that qualifies as
private property under the patterning definition. Such an approach

quotation in the takings context, see, for example, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992), Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984), and
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
6. See generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 58–60 (2002)
(presenting a collection of cases from eminent domain and regulatory takings law that pose
the question of whether an entitlement is “private property”).
7. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Philips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
8. Philips, 524 U.S. at 172. The later decision, Brown, adhered to the conclusion reached
in Philips about whether interest earned on client funds is the private property of the client
but held that no compensation was owed for taking that property because the money would
not have earned any interest absent the program. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235, 241.
9. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885,
942–54 (2000).
10. Merrill, supra note 9, at 952–54. This approach was anticipated by my colleague
Henry Monaghan. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property”, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 435 (1977).
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is necessary, I have argued, in order to make sense of precedents
that tell us, for example, that ownership of land is a type of private
property covered by the Takings Clause but that government transfer payments and tax breaks are not.11 In other words, we need some
federal constitutional principle that tells us what types of state-created interests fall within the universe of “private property,” as that
term is used in the Constitution, before we can proceed to examine
state law.
I stand by what I have said on this score with respect to resolving
the threshold question of whether an asserted interest is or is not
private property protected by the Takings Clause. The objective of
this Article is to extend the inquiry to consider what I will call subsidiary questions that arise once we decide that an interest is covered by the Takings Clause. These are questions that concern matters
such as whether the government has “taken” the property, whether
the taking is for a “public use,” and if the government action qualifies as a taking for public use, whether it has given the claimant
“just compensation” for the taking.
To illustrate, consider the question of whether the government has
given the claimant just compensation. The meaning of just compensation could be resolved exclusively as a matter of federal constitutional law, with courts specifying exactly what sorts of valuation
procedures all state and federal tribunals must use in fixing compensation. Or, conceivably, courts could defer completely to state
law for determining what valuation procedures yield just compensation in any given context. Or (as I have argued in deciding whether
the claimant has an interest that qualifies as “private property”),
courts could articulate a general patterning definition of what constitutes just compensation, which could then be used to determine
whether a particular state-valuation procedure satisfies this patterning definition.
Those familiar with the Supreme Court precedent in this area
will recognize that the patterning-definition option best describes
11. With respect to land, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Inc., 505 U.S. 1003,
1017 n.7 (1992) (fee simple in land is clearly protected by the Takings Clause). On the lack
of takings protections for transfer payments, see Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1986). Taxes (and hence presumably the repeal of
tax breaks) have long been regarded as immune from takings challenges. See Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 614–15 (2013) (“It is beyond dispute . . . that
‘[t]axes . . . are not “takings.”’”).
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the approach that has been taken with regard to determining whether
the government has provided just compensation. The Court has held
that just compensation generally means fair market value.12 But it
has not attempted to dictate, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, what valuation techniques state courts or other subordinate
tribunals must use in determining fair market value. The choice of
valuation procedures has largely been left to state law to specify.13
Indeed, we can see that the Court has, in one context or another,
embraced each of the three options for resolving subsidiary issues in
taking cases. As an example of the purely federal constitutional
approach, consider the distinction between appropriations and regulations. Appropriations are governed by a per se rule—they are
categorically regarded as takings.14 Regulations are governed by a
multifactor test that rarely results in a finding of liability.15 The distinction was launched in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV,
which describes the relevant per se category as a “permanent physical occupation” of land.16 Subsequent cases held that the category
did not include schemes that prohibit landlords from terminating
tenancies, even if this can be said to result in a permanent (or at
least indefinite) occupation by the tenant.17 Then the Court held,
without much analysis, that the category includes public easements
imposed on private land, even though these entail rights of use as
opposed to permanent or indefinite occupations.18 Most recently, the
Court has extended the category to include personal property as
well as land and has redescribed the category as “physical appropriations.”19 The relevant point is that each of these zigzags was announced as a proposition of federal constitutional law, with no
consideration given to the content of state property law.

12. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
13. For example, states have been allowed to adopt divergent rules with respect to
offsetting benefits (see 3 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A (3d ed. 2018))
and with respect to the undivided fee rule (4 id. § 12.05).
14. Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–30 (2015).
15. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
16. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 441 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fla.
Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
18. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385–86 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987).
19. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427.
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One must scratch a bit harder to identify an example of a purestate law approach to a subsidiary issue. One possibility is the
determination of the identity of the owner of a property. In various
contexts where property has been subdivided between surface and
subsurface rights or between landlord and tenant, or when there
has been a transfer from corporate ownership to shareholders or
from parents to children, the Court has unquestioningly accepted
the characterization of ownership under state law.20 Here we see the
gravitational force of the proposition that property rights are defined and enforced as a matter of state law.
The patterning definition can be seen at work in fixing the methods
for determining just compensation, as previously discussed. Another
example is the nuisance exception to takings liability recognized in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.21 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion was clear—controversially so—in stipulating that the exception applies only to government regulation of conduct regarded as
a public or private nuisance at common law.22 This characterization
of the nuisance exception constitutes a federal constitutional-patterning definition. Federal constitutional law, according to Lucas,
limits the relevant category of laws that would satisfy the exception
to those that track the common law of nuisance. Having gone this
far in describing the exception, the Court then remanded the case to
the South Carolina courts for a determination of whether the conduct at issue—building a home on a barrier island exposed to hurricane damage—would constitute a nuisance under South Carolina
common law.23 Thus we see the two basic elements that comprise
the patterning-definition approach: federal constitutional law defines the general pattern of a particular state of affairs, and an investigation of state law determines whether that definition is satisfied
in a particular case.
20. For example in Loretto v. Teleprompter, the Court accepted, uncritically, the state law
proposition that the landlord has exclusive control over the roof of a building, and the tenants’
interest is confined to the particular unit in which the tenants hold the lease. 458 U.S. at 439.
Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court accepted, uncritically, the state law proposition that the dissolution of a corporation for nonpayment of taxes effected a transfer of title
from the corporation to its shareholder. 533 U.S. 606, 614, 626–30 (2001).
21. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
22. Id. at 1029–31. Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment, objecting specifically
to this limitation. Id. at 1035.
23. Id. at 1031 (majority opinion).
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Before turning to the issue in Murr,24 a further observation about
the patterning-definition approach is warranted. In contrast to the
pure-federal option or the pure-state option, there are undoubtedly
different versions of the patterning-definition option. For present purposes, I will distinguish between “thick” and “thin” patterning definitions. A thick definition is one in which federal constitutional law
does most of the work, leaving relatively little room for variations
based on state law. A thin definition is one in which federal constitutional law imposes only a mild constraint on the range of permissible variations under state law. These, undoubtedly, describe points on
a continuum with many conceivable patterning definitions falling
somewhere in between.
II. MURR V. WISCONSIN
The Murr family owned two plots of land on the St. Croix River
in Wisconsin. Everyone agreed this land was “private property” protected by the Takings Clause. What Murr presented was a subsidiary question under Court-made takings doctrine that has played a
prominent role in regulatory takings cases: the extent or degree to
which the challenged regulation diminished the value of the claimant’s private property.25 Diminution in value appeared in the Court’s
inaugural decision recognizing the possibility of a regulatory taking.26
It was reaffirmed as a factor of “particular significance” under Penn
Central’s ad hoc approach to identifying a taking.27 It is also the
critical factor under Lucas’s categorical rule for regulations that deprive an owner of all economic value.28
Diminution in value requires measuring what portion of economic
value has been lost because of a challenged regulation. In order to
perform this measurement, it is necessary to compare the value of the
property before adoption of the regulation with the value afterwards.
This, in turn, requires that we identify the unit of property that will
be used in making the before-and-after comparison. This has been

24. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
25. Id. at 1940, 1941–42.
26. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“One fact for consideration . . . is the
extent of the diminution.”).
27. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
28. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016–17 & n.7.
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called the “numerator/denominator” problem.29 The “denominator” is
the relevant unit of property for purposes of analysis. The “numerator” is the portion of value of that unit eliminated by the regulation.
Often there will be no issue about identifying the relevant unit of
property for purposes of measuring diminution in value. Suppose the
property is Blackacre, a perfectly square acre of land. The government decides the land is the critical habitat of an endangered species of toad and forbids all human activity on Blackacre in an effort
to save the toad. The denominator is Blackacre, and the diminution
in value caused by the endangerment order is the numerator.
In other circumstances, identifying the appropriate denominator
can pose quite a puzzle. Suppose the property consists of ten acres
of land. Suppose further that the owner would like to subdivide the
parcel into ten one-acre lots and sell them for single-family homes.
The government intervenes and decides that half of the tract—five
of the acres—is a wetland, which cannot be developed. Is this a loss
of fifty percent of the value of the ten-acre parcel, or is it a loss of
one hundred percent of the value of five individual lots?
Now consider a variation on the hypothetical. Instead of starting
with a ten-acre parcel, the developer acquires ten contiguous undeveloped one-acre plots with the intention of creating a subdivision
and selling the lots for homes. The government intervenes as before.
The same question is posed: is this a loss of fifty percent of the whole
or one hundred percent of half?
Murr presented a variation on the consolidation-of-separate-lots
problem. The Murr family bought two contiguous lots, Lot E and Lot
F, and built a cabin on Lot F. Lot E was held for investment and future sale. After the lots were purchased by the senior Murrs but
before they were transferred to the children, the local zoning authority adopted a rule imposing a minimum-lot-size restriction on future
development. The new rule prohibited development on lots the size
of Lot E if owned next to another contiguous lot like F. The Murrs
were permitted to build a fancy new home on the combined lots, but
were no longer able to sell Lot E to a third party for development into
a separate home. The Murrs argued that Lot E standing alone was
the relevant denominator, which would mean the minimum-lot-size
rule arguably generated a large diminution in value. The government
29. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1992 (1967)).
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argued that Lots E and F together were the relevant denominator,
making the diminution relatively small.30
Previous decisions had offered some guidance as to how to define
denominators. The Supreme Court had seemingly settled on the notion that in cases of land the denominator is the “parcel as a whole.”31
The significance of this, in the cases previously decided, is that one
cannot “conceptually sever” the parcel into subparcels, which are then
used as the denominator.32 There are ambiguities here, but I take
it that what the Court had meant in these cases is that one cannot
invoke a hypothetical severance of land in determining the denominator. Thus, one cannot divide a single parcel of land into surface
rights and as-of-yet unsevered air rights, and treat the air rights as
the denominator.33 Nor can one divide a fee simple of indefinite
duration into as-of-yet unsevered time-limited rights and residual
rights, with the time-limited rights serving as the denominator.34
One must take the actual holding of the claimant at the time of the
regulation to be the relevant denominator.35
In what follows, I assume that the injunction against conceptual
severance is properly regarded as part of a federal constitutional
30. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941–42.
31. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331–32 (2002).
32. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 318 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)). See generally Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1667, 1677 (1988).
33. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31.
34. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331–32.
35. Thus, I assume that if the Penn Central Corporation had previously severed the air
rights above Grand Central Station and transferred them to a third party, and the Historic
Preservation Commission had thereafter prohibited the third party from developing the air
rights, the relevant denominator would be the air rights. Similarly, if a property owner in the
Lake Tahoe region had previously entered into a three-year lease for purposes of developing
property, and the Regional Planning Commission imposed a three-year moratorium on development, the relevant denominator would be the three-year lease. Keystone Bituminous
Coal might be thought to run counter to this reading, given that the Court declined to treat
a waiver of surface support, an actual holding of some of the mineral rights claimants in the
case, as a denominator. But the Court was careful to explain that “the support estate is
always owned by either the owner of the surface or the owner of the minerals.” 480 U.S. at
500–01. Thus the denominator was properly regarded as the mineral estate plus the waiver
of surface support, not the waiver of surface support standing alone. In any event, the Court
did not reach the diminution-in-value question because the case was brought as a facial
challenge to the statute and the record was “devoid of any evidence on what percentage of the
purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate,
has been affected by the Act.” Id. at 501.
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definition of denominators. But the issue in Murr could not be answered by invoking the rule against conceptual severance. The question was how to define the “parcel as a whole” when a single owner
actually owns two contiguous lots. In other words, the question concerned the proper definition of “parcel as a whole” along the horizontal dimension. The Supreme Court had not spoken to this question.36
In developing an answer, none of the briefs identified the full
range of options. The Murrs and the State of Wisconsin argued that
the definition of parcel in this context should be resolved as a matter of state law. They disagreed about what state law required. The
Murrs maintained that each lot was a parcel.37 The State said that
under state law the two lots should be regarded as merged into one.38
St. Croix County, and the federal government appearing as amicus
curiae, argued that the horizontal dimensions of the parcel should
not be based on “legalistic distinctions” grounded in state law.39 Implicitly, this meant that the parcel should be defined as a matter of
federal constitutional law. Interestingly, both briefs were quite coy
about acknowledging that the case posed a choice between federal
and state law. What is clear is that they were worried that developers
could manipulate the size and shape of individual parcels in order
to bolster takings claims if the matter were left to state law. As to
the content of the proper approach to defining the denominator in
this context, both litigants proposed a multifactor balancing test.40
The Justices split along similar lines. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the majority adopted a federal constitutional-law solution, which
took the form of a multifactor balancing test.41 Perhaps because the
briefs did little to develop the choice-of-law issue, Justice Kennedy
offered only a cursory justification for federalizing the question. Board
36. For a discussion of lower court cases that had struggled with the horizontal-definition
problem and various possible solutions, see John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI L. REV. 1535 (1994).
37. Petitioners’ Brief at 24–32, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214),
2016 WL 1459199, at *24–32; Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 7–11, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15214), 2016 WL 4072806, at *7–11.
38. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin at 29–37, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214),
2016 WL 3227033, at *29–37 [hereinafter Brief for State of Wisconsin].
39. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, 23, Murr, 137
S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 3398637, at *20, *23 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
40. Brief for Respondent St. Croix Cty. at 52, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214), 2016 WL
3254214, at *52; Brief for the United States, supra note 39, at 20–22.
41. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–49.
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of Regents v. Roth and the many cases citing the primacy of state law
in creating and defining property were not mentioned.42 Instead,
Justice Kennedy stated that “the Court has expressed caution” about
the proposition that “property rights under the Takings Clause should
be coextensive with those under state law.”43 The only support for the
proposition that such “caution” was appropriate was a prior opinion
by Justice Kennedy holding that regulations in effect when property
is acquired do not automatically become background principles qualifying owner expectations.44 It is reasonably clear from the opinion
that the motive for opting for federal law, following the government
submissions, was fear of manipulation of denominators, or “gamesmanship” to use Justice Kennedy’s term.45 In Justice Kennedy’s exposition, however, fear of government manipulation to defeat takings
claims received equal billing with fear of developer manipulation of
the size of parcels to manufacture takings claims.
Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, clearly recognized the centrality
of the choice-of-law issue, and came down forthrightly in favor of
state law.46 The Chief Justice objected to federalizing the definition
of parcel on the grounds that this was contrary to precedent (namely,
the many references in the cases to Board of Regents v. Roth), and
(at least in the majority’s formulation) that this confused the question
of what property is at stake with the question of whether the regulation constitutes a taking.47 He also suggested, briefly, that the concern with manipulation was overblown.48 There was no discussion
in either opinion of the possibility of a federal-patterning definition.
My objective in the remainder of these remarks is to offer a different
solution to the numerator/denominator puzzle in the context of fixing
the horizontal dimensions of an interest in land. My proposal consists
42. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and cases cited
supra note 5.
43. Id. at 1944.
44. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)). The issue in Palazzolo was
whether a regulatory limitation on the use of property that was in effect when the title to the
property was acquired automatically eliminates any investment-backed expectation inconsistent with the regulation. 533 U.S. at 626–27. In keeping with Justice Kennedy’s balancing
proclivities, the Court held such a limitation was a factor to take into account, but was not
dispositive. Id. at 626.
45. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
46. Id. at 1953–54 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1953–56 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1953 (“[S]uch obvious attempts to alter the legal landscape in anticipation of a
lawsuit are unlikely and not particularly difficult to detect and discern.”).
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of what I will characterize as a “thin” federal-patterning definition.
One part of the patterning definition consists of the rule prohibiting
conceptual severance. Only actual holdings should be considered, not
hypothetical holdings.49 The other part consists of the rule that actual
lot lines established under state law presumptively control, subject
to an exception if it can be shown that the lines have been deliberately
drawn to enhance the prospect of federal constitutional-takings liability. This is a patterning definition rather than a pure-state law approach because it contains federal content—the rejection of conceptual
severance and the instruction to treat lot lines as established by
state law as presumptively controlling absent manipulation to create liability. It is a thin rather than a thick patterning definition
because in nearly all cases the answers generated by these rules will
be grounded in state law, rather than federal constitutional law.
The justification for this proposed approach is in three parts. The
first consists of the argument that a purely federal definition of parcel
injects unnecessary complexity into regulatory takings cases. The
second, which is contingent on the form of the federal rule adopted by
Justice Kennedy, consists of the argument that a multifactor balancing test is particularly undesirable in determining the denominator
in this context. The third is based on concerns about manipulability,
cited by the government parties in the Murr case and echoed by
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Justice Kennedy’s worry about
government manipulation, I argue, can be handled by traditional
doctrine that would disregard state law that lacks a fair and substantial basis when used to defeat a federal constitutional right. The
government’s anxiety about developer manipulation can be handled
by building a narrow exception into the patterning definition that
would allow courts to disregard lots lines that have been manipulated
to manufacture a takings claim.
III. THE COMPLEXITY PROBLEM
My proposed federal-patterning definition would give lot lines as
established under state law presumptive effect in fixing the horizontal

49. Although the Court has not offered an explicit justification for the rule against conceptual severance, the most plausible justification would seem to be a concern about potential
manipulation of denominators to bolster takings claims. In this respect, the rule against
conceptual severance is simply one manifestation of a larger patterning rule disallowing
attempts by landowners to manipulate denominators.
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dimensions of the whole parcel. One reason is to simplify the inquiry
and make it relatively easy for state regulators and state court
judges—the first-line enforcers of regulatory takings law—to comprehend and apply in fixing the denominator.
To begin, different states have adopted different approaches to determining the horizontal boundaries of parcels of land. As Wisconsin’s
Brief pointed out,50 some states use metes-and-bounds surveys and
some follow the federal-rectangular survey. Regardless of which of
these basic survey methods is followed, urban land is typically divided
into blocks that are, in turn, divided into lots. So you have three different systems that exist in various combinations in different states.
Moreover, states differ as to the legal requirements for establishing parcel boundaries.51 Some require the formal recordation of plats
showing separate parcels in order to give legal effect to individual
lot descriptions by survey, others do not. Perhaps most relevant to
the Murr dispute, some states require the merger of lots as a matter
of law when certain things happen, such as contiguous lots coming
into common ownership. Others provide that merger occurs only
after a formal process initiated by an owner or others when previous
lot designations are canceled and new descriptions are issued.
Another consideration is that determining the scope of parcels by
these methods serves multiple purposes. Discrete parcels are nearly
always used for preparing property tax bills. They are also critical
in doing title searches, whether for purposes of preparing deeds of
sale, processing land in probate proceedings, or using land as collateral for secured loans. They play a critical role in bankruptcy. For
example, if the Murrs’ plumbing company went bankrupt before the
lots were transferred to the Murr children, Lot F would be an asset
of the company in bankruptcy, but Lot E would not.52
The state law governing parcel identification also plays a critical
role in resolving boundary disputes and adverse possession cases.
And most relevantly, state rules for identifying parcels are used in
establishing zoning districts and in resolving requests for zoning

50. Brief for State of Wisconsin, supra note 38, at 6–7.
51. See, e.g., id. at 11–13.
52. Title to Lot F was held in the name of the Murrs’ plumbing company between 1963
and 1994, when it was conveyed to their children. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940–41 (majority
opinion). Lot E was always owned by either the senior Murrs or their children. Id. at 1941.
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variances, amendments, or special use permits.53 There is much to
be said for using the same set of rules for all purposes. Under current
law, which relies on state law, this is possible.54 Adopting a special
federal definition of “parcel” for takings purposes would inevitably
mean that there would be two different legal regimes for defining
parcels, at least for some purposes.
Another factor to take into account is that local lawyers and officials will have developed significant expertise in applying the relevant state-law rules for ascertaining the horizontal boundaries of
land parcels. There is, if you will, significant human capital invested
in understanding and applying these rules. In contrast, there is zero
expertise at this point in applying a special federal constitutional
definition of parcel.
Those of us who spend a lot of time thinking about regulatory
takings issues tend to forget how extremely episodic these cases are,
relative to the large mass of land transactions that raise other issues.55
Local property lawyers, state officials, and state judges will be familiar
with the state process for defining parcels. It makes sense to piggyback on this local knowledge. Takings cases are sufficiently rare that
no relevant expertise is likely to develop for applying a special federal constitutional definition of parcel if it diverges in any significant
way from the state definition. Moreover, since regulatory takings
challenges will emerge primarily out of fights over zoning, there are
particularly good reasons for using the same set of rules for zoning
purposes and for resolving occasional constitutional challenges to
zoning decisions.
IV. THE BALANCING -TEST PROBLEM
We also have to ask: what would a purely federal constitutional
definition of parcel look like? Judging by Justice Kennedy’s effort in

53. The Murr case arose on a denial of the family’s request for a variance from applicable
zoning regulations. Id.
54. Wisconsin statutory law would seem to point in this direction. See WIS. STAT. § 236.28
(2016) (“[T]he lots in [a] plat shall be described by the name of the plat and the lot and block . . .
for all purposes, including those of assessment, taxation, devise, descent and conveyance.”).
55. An interesting source in this regard is a fifty-state survey of takings law commissioned
by an ABA committee. See AM. BAR ASS’N CONDEMNATION, ZONING & LAND USE COMM., THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN: FIFTY-STATE SURVEY (William G. Blake ed., 2012). The survey reveals a
surprising dearth of authority in many states about how to handle regulatory takings claims.
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Murr, it is a kind of bouillabaisse put together from the catch of the
day. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority said that “no single
consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the denominator.”56 Instead, a “multifactor standard” is required,57 one that
includes consideration of a state law’s treatment of the land along
with its physical characteristics and prospective value. But even these
factors were qualified by the Court. The state-law treatment is relevant only if it is “reasonable.”58 The physical characteristics include
“the parcel’s associated topography, and the surrounding human
and ecological environment.”59 The prospective value must consider
benefits from the regulation such as “increasing privacy, expanding
recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.”60 The
ultimate question in every case is whether reasonable “expectations
about property ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that
his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate
tracts.”61 In short—in what may be the biggest understatement of all
regulatory takings jurisprudence—“the question of the proper parcel
in regulatory takings cases cannot be solved by any simple test.”62
I have an innate aversion to multifactor balancing tests. I always
suspect that they are a placeholder designed to provide a basis for
a decision when the proponent has no theory about how the matter
in question should be decided. What multifactor balancing amounts
to, in practice, is a delegation of authority to courts to decide matters ex post as they see fit. Such approaches have virtually no predictability. This invites litigation and makes it hard to settle cases.
It also undermines the central purpose of having a property regime
in the first place, which is to protect expectations about the control
and use of resources.
In this particular context, the multifactor approach also yields up
a kind of mind-boggling complexity. In effect, the federal definition of
parcel requires the use of a multifactor balancing test to define the
horizontal dimensions of a parcel, with no predetermined weight given
to any of the factors. This is just to figure out what the denominator
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
Id. at 1948.
Id. at 1945.
Id.
Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1945.
Id. at 1950.
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should be for doing the numerator/denominator test. The numerator/denominator test, in turn, is just one of three factors under the
Penn Central–multifactor balancing test. So in effect you have one
multifactor balancing test piled on top of another multifactor balancing test. To borrow Maureen Brady’s expression, Murr is “Penn
Central squared.”63
In Lucas-type cases, the effect of the multifactor test to define the
parcel is effectively to transform a subset of total takings cases (those
where there is some question about the horizontal scope of the parcel)
into de facto–Penn Central cases. If you hate Lucas and love Penn
Central, this is perhaps a good thing. But it seems like a backhanded
way to partially overrule Lucas, which has turned out to be a pretty
harmless precedent in practice.64 Either way, regulatory takings
law, which is already far too complicated and confusing, becomes
virtually incomprehensible to all but the most diligent student-note
writers. It will be utterly baffling to most local-land use lawyers and
state court judges. Given that the Supreme Court has done very
little in the forty years since Penn Central was decided to clarify the
factors it identified there,65 it is fanciful to think that the Court will
provide significant guidance to state court judges struggling to apply
the new federal constitutional definition of parcel.
The primary effect of the Court’s adoption of an ad hoc, federal
constitutional-balancing test for determining the horizontal dimensions of the “parcel as a whole” will be to increase the costs of litigating
regulatory takings cases, magnify the uncertainty of the outcome,
and give the government another argument that can be used to defeat such claims. If a federal constitutional rule is imperative in these
circumstances, the rule adopted by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals—
that contiguous lots under the same ownership should always be
regarded as a single parcel—would be infinitely preferable.66 This

63. Maureen Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin
Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017); see also Nicole Stelle
Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131.
64. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 2, at 87 (finding that only about 3.5 % of regulatory
takings cases involve Lucas-type claims and only about half are successful).
65. Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. REV. 649, 652
(2012).
66. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-1, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (reproducing the
opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2014) (unpublished)). The Court majority expressed doubt about whether the Court of Appeals
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would at least be relatively clear and would likely reduce the costs
of litigating regulatory takings claims. Sometimes a bit of over- or underinclusiveness can result in more enforcement of constitutional
rights than a more fine-grained but confusing and costly approach.67
V. THE RISK OF MANIPULATION
Given these objections, what explains the Court’s decision to federalize the law for determining the horizontal boundaries of parcels of
land for takings purposes? The short answer is that the government
parties in Murr, and the majority of Justices who joined Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, were worried about “gamesmanship.”68 Reading
the briefs, it is clear that the government lawyers were anxious about
manipulation by developers. Especially in the context of subdivision
development, developers have considerable discretion in drawing and
recording lot lines. The government lawyers worried that if the horizontal scope of parcel is determined wholly as a matter of state law,
developers would be able to manipulate the denominator to manufacture plausible regulatory takings claims where they would otherwise not exist.69
This is not a completely idle concern. The Solicitor General cited
several cases (including Lost Tree Village,70 where the government’s
petition for writ of certiorari was held for Murr) in which a developer sold off the vast majority of lots in a subdivision and then
brought a takings challenge against a development restriction on the
small number of remaining lots.71 Although these cases confirm that
the risk of manipulation is real, they do not tell us anything about
the magnitude of the risk. I would observe, in this connection, that

had adopted a bright-line rule, but said, “To the extent the state court treated the two lots as
one parcel based on a bright-line rule, nothing in this opinion approves that methodology, as
distinct from the result.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949.
67. See Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 920–26 (1999).
68. 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
69. See, e.g., notes 37–40 and accompanying texts. I refer throughout to manipulation by “developers,” since real estate developers will be the property owners most frequently involved in
regulatory takings disputes. But of course the principles discussed apply to all property owners.
70. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
71. For other cases allegedly involving gamesmanship by developers, see Brief for the
United States, supra note 39, at 22–23.
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there is no evidence that the Murr family set about to manipulate
the demarcation of Lots E and F in order to generate a takings claim.
Rather than create federal constitutional rules to head off a perceived risk of manipulation, which may or may not be a significant
problem, it would seem to be more prudent to wait until a case of
manipulation actually arises before determining whether a federal
definition is needed as a response.
A more general point is that, putting aside takings claims, manipulation of lots lines is something that makes property in land a valuable
institution. Property is scalable, meaning one can add to or subtract
from existing property and still have property.72 Specifically, the ability of a landowner to subdivide the land into smaller lots or parcels
can enhance the value of the land. Similarly, the ability of an owner
to acquire contiguous lots and consolidate them into a larger tract can
also enhance the value of the land. This is a primary reason why state
law gives owners substantial freedom to add to and subtract from
existing rights in land, which is another way of saying that state law
gives owners the freedom to manipulate lot lines. What is a matter of
concern is the potential manipulation of lot lines to create or defeat
a constitutional claim for just compensation. It is important that in
devising some way to avoid this socially undesirable form of manipulation we do not interfere with the socially desirable forms.
A second and related point is that manipulating denominators to
gin up takings claims is not a very promising way to make money in
real estate. Regulatory takings claims almost never succeed,73 and
they require a large investment of time and effort in litigation. A
much better way to make money is to plat a subdivision in such a
way as to sell lots to prospective purchasers at attractive prices. So,
one would expect that manipulation to create or defeat takings
claims would be relatively rare behavior.
A third consideration is that it is far from clear that local governments need a federal definition of parcel in order to protect themselves
from parcel-manipulating developers. If takings claims succeed based

72. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1713 (2012).
73. Empirical surveys of cases that apply the Penn Central-ad hoc test concur that only
about ten percent of claimants are successful. See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35
Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or One Strike Rule?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677 (2013); Krier
& Sterk, supra note 2, at 89.
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on challenges to local land use regulations, local governments are
the ones that have to pay. This should give them ample incentive to
develop rules or doctrines as a matter of state law that would disallow plats or plat amendments that seem designed to concoct takings
claims. For example, a plat that demarcates lots that exactly trace
the boundaries of a wetland could be disallowed. An analogy here is
the doctrine of abuse of rights, sometimes relied upon by state court
judges to refuse to enforce principles of law when they are manipulated to extort money from others or otherwise engage in opportunistic behavior.74 Under general principles of subsidiarity, it makes
sense to see if state law can head off manipulation rather than jumping to federalization of a key component of property law.
Although the danger of manipulation by private developers was
the focus of the government lawyers in Murr, Justice Kennedy turned
the prospect of manipulation into a bidirectional concern. One danger
of using state law to define parcels, he wrote, is that a state might
define parcel to include multiple tracts only tangentially related to
each other or even all property owned by a person, anywhere in the
state. These sorts of moves would “improperly . . . fortify” the state
against takings claims.75 He cited no example of this happening in
the nearly one hundred years since diminution in value was introduced as a relevant variable in takings cases. Given the general
hostility to takings of property by the government—as illustrated by
the widespread amendment of state laws in response to the Kelo
decision76—the posited fear of state manipulation of the concept of
parcel for the sole purpose of defeating takings claims strikes me as
far-fetched. Again, the proper response would seem to be to wait for
an actual case of such manipulation before deciding whether a federal constitutional response is warranted.

74. There is no formal doctrine of abuse of rights in the common law. See Anna di
Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 687
(2010). Some have argued, however, that the principle is implicit in the law of equity. Joseph
M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37 (1995). A prominent
common-law case thought to embody the principle is Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich.
46 (1878) (Cooley, J.) (declining to enjoin a nuisance at the behest of a landowner who
purchased property in the hope of extracting a large payment from another property owner).
75. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
76. See generally ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE
LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 141–64 (2015).
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VI. THE PATTERNING -DEFINITION ALTERNATIVE
It nevertheless remains true that five Justices in Murr were
convinced that manipulation of denominators was a sufficiently
worrisome prospect that the definition of parcel, for Takings Clause
purposes, could not be left to state law. The solution they adopted
was complete federalization. My view, to the contrary, is that the most
that is needed to handle the worry about manipulation is a thin
federal-patterning definition. In addressing the proper legal response
to potential risks of manipulation, one must divide the inquiry between government manipulation to defeat takings liability, and
developer manipulation to generate takings liability.
The risk of government manipulation is the risk that state legislatures or courts will change or interpret state law in such a way as to
expand the scope of parcels—that is, expand the denominator—and
thereby shrink diminution in value. This is similar to the risk that
has episodically arisen in other contexts when state governments
have attempted to manipulate state law to evade or frustrate the
enforcement of federal rights.77 The time-honored way of policing
this kind of manipulation of state law is something called the “fair
and substantial basis” test.78 The test applies when some proposition
of state law is an antecedent to the enforcement of federal rights.
Federal courts, when they suspect that state law has been manipulated to frustrate federal rights, will review a purported change in
or reinterpretation of state law to determine whether it has a “fair
and substantial basis” in pre-existing state law. Brantley Webb, in
a comprehensive note in the Yale Law Review, shows that the test
is only applied when there are strong reasons to suspect evasion of

77. For a general discussion of the many contexts in which the issue arises, see Henry
Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in
Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1957–86 (2003).
78. The “fair and substantial basis” test was considered as a possible way of resolving
“judicial takings” claims in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010). Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion acknowledged
that the test has been used in cases that evaded the Court’s ability to review federal questions
(id. at 725–26) but argued that a better formulation, in the context of a judicial takings claim,
was whether the state court had eliminated an “established property right.” Id. at 726. His
proposed formulation failed to command a majority. In the context of a state manipulating the
state law of land boundaries in order to defeat a regulatory takings claim, the tried-and-true
test for dealing with evasions of federal rights seems appropriate.
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federal rights. When such evidence is missing, federal courts routinely defer to the state authorities’ understanding of state law.79
This seems to me to provide the answer to Justice Kennedy’s worry
about state-government manipulation of denominators to defeat
takings claims.
The problem of developer manipulation is different. Developers
have no power to change state law. Indeed, the danger of manipulation in this context comes about from developers using state law in
a perfectly lawful manner to make changes in lot lines. Adjusting lot
lines is something that developers, like every landowner, have broad
discretion to do. The concern is that developers will use the discretion conferred by state law in such a way as to shrink the horizontal
dimensions of lot lines, thereby reducing the denominator and making
it more likely that they can prevail in a regulatory takings claim.
What is needed is some legal basis for judges, when they confront
this kind of manipulation, to be able to deem the proper dimensions
of a parcel to be something other than what the developer would have
them to be. Because the problem here is created by the lawful use
of state law to generate a federal constitutional claim where none
should exist, the solution must come from federal constitutional law.
To the extent, then, that we credit the danger of developer manipulation of lot lines—as did five Justices in Murr—the federal-patterning
definition of “parcel as a whole” must include the power to designate
the horizontal dimensions of a parcel to be other than what they are
under state law. The power to redraw lot lines in this fashion should
be exercised only when a court is convinced that the lot lines have
been manipulated by a developer in an effort to create or maximize the
plausibility of a regulatory takings claim. If not convinced that the
lines have been drawn in an effort to manipulate the takings inquiry,
the lot lines as established by the developer should be accepted as is
and should define the horizontal extent of the relevant parcel.
What kind of evidence should be considered in deciding whether
the lot lines are the product of developer manipulation? Obviously,
it will be rare to uncover “smoking gun” evidence of intent to draw lot
lines to bolster a takings case. At least this will be rare as long as
the attorney-client privilege exists. Two types of circumstantial
79. E. Brantley Webb, How to Review State Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1192 (2011).
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evidence would seem to be sufficient to raise a red flag that manipulation is likely occurring.
One type of evidence would be lot lines that are drawn to correspond
to the scope of a challenged regulation. For example, if a developer
challenges a building set-back regulation and establishes lot lines
that exactly correspond to the area required to comply with the setback provision, this would be strong evidence that the lots lines
have been established in an effort to declare the set-back regulation
a taking.80 The same would follow for lot lines that correspond to a
wetland, the critical habitat of an endangered species, or an openspace requirement.
A second type of evidence would be lot lines drawn in such a way
that they have no plausible commercial value.81 Here the inference
of manipulation is less clear-cut. Sometimes developers make mistakes about what the market will find attractive. But if it appears that
lot lines have been drawn in such a way that they have no plausible
commercial value, this at least should give rise to further inquiry into
whether the motivation may have been to bolster a takings claim.
The main point is that these sorts of inquiries should be undertaken only when the government has a legitimate basis for claiming
that lot lines have been manipulated in order to create or bolster a
claim of a regulatory taking. Such cases will be unusual. In the ordinary, run-of-the-mill regulatory takings case, the lot lines established
under state law should be used in fixing the horizontal dimensions
of the “parcel as a whole” for the purposes of computing diminution
in value.
VII. THE PROPER DISPOSITION
Suppose I am right that Murr should have been resolved by adopting a thin federal-patterning definition that treats lots lines established under state law as presumptively valid unless a court is
convinced that the lines have been manipulated to bolster a takings
claim. What, then, was the proper measure of the “parcel as a

80. See, e.g., Fee, supra note 36, at 1559.
81. This is Fee’s test for determining the horizontal scope of the denominator. See Fee
supra note 36, at 1557–62. He would evidently apply this test in all cases, whereas in my
formulation it would be relevant only as circumstantial evidence of developer manipulation.
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whole” in Murr? As previously indicated, there was no evidence the
Murrs acquired Lots E and F in an effort to manipulate the
numerator/denominator inquiry under federal takings law. Consequently, there was no basis, under my proposed patterning definition, to disregard the relevant definition of parcel under Wisconsin
law. So how did Wisconsin law define the parcel in this case: Lot E
alone, or Lots E and F merged together?
It turns out that the answer was not very clear. The question boils
down to whether Wisconsin, or more accurately, St. Croix County,
had a rule of law requiring that contiguous lots be merged into a
single lot in circumstances like the one involving the Murrs. Wisconsin’s brief relied on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’s decision rejecting the family’s request for a variance. That decision said, at one
point, that under the relevant county-zoning rules Lots E and F were
“effectively merged.”82 But note carefully the qualifier: “effectively.”
What does effectively merged mean? Does it mean that the minimumlot size regulation had the same practical effect as if the lots had
been merged? This is not the same as saying they were merged as
a matter of law.
In the second decision by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that
addressed the Murrs’ constitutional challenge, the court said flatly
that the transfer of Lot E to the Murr children “brought the lots
under common ownership and resulted in a merger of the two lots
under [the local ordinance].”83 But this decision, which was unpublished, was based on the understanding that for regulatory takings
purposes contiguous lots must always be regarded as merged—an
idea expressly disapproved by the U.S. Supreme Court.84 The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to review either of the Court of
Appeals’ decisions in the Murr controversy.
82. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 332 Wis. 2d 172, 184, 796 N.W. 2d 837, 844
(Wis. App. 2011). Several paragraphs later, the court stated: “[M]erger of adjacent substandard lots that come under common ownership will preserve the environment in the same
ways that merger of lots already under common ownership would do. The failure to merge
would have the opposite effect, with no countervailing property value concern.” Id. at 184, 796
N.W. 2d at 844. This also falls short of saying that the lots were merged as a matter of law,
as opposed to “effectively merged” because of the prohibition of building on “substandard” lots
contiguous with another lot.
83. Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2014) (unpublished).
84. See supra note 66.
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In effect, there was no Wisconsin precedent, before the Murr controversy arose, that ruled the St. Croix zoning ordinance required
a merger of contiguous lots as a matter of law. The County and the
National Association of Counties, as amicus curiae, argued at length
that merger provisions have a “long and rich” history and have never
been held to cause a taking.85 This is true but was beside the point.
The real question was whether Wisconsin, either through state statute, the local ordinance, state common law, or otherwise, had a mandatory merger rule. As to that question, only one authority was cited
by the governments—the first Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision
in Murr. And that decision said only that the lots were “effectively
merged,” not that they were merged as a matter of law.86
In these circumstances, if the Court had concluded that under the
relevant federal-patterning definition the scope of the relevant parcel
was controlled by state law, the proper course was to remand the
case to the Wisconsin courts, with instructions for those courts to clarify whether, under Wisconsin law, a zoning ordinance like the one in
St. Croix County requires the merger of contiguous lots as a matter
of law. Rather than adopting a federal constitutional definition of
parcel, which will only be a source of endless confusion and litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court should have asked Wisconsin’s courts
to clarify what Wisconsin law says about the scope of the relevant
parcel. The answer to this question would then establish whether
the denominator for the purpose of the regulatory takings claim was
one lot or two.
The last thing I should note is that the resolution of the relevant
denominator, under Wisconsin property law, would not resolve the
regulatory takings question. Even if it turned out that Wisconsin
law treated Lots E and F as distinct parcels, it would still be necessary to show that the diminution in value caused by the minimumlot-size requirement caused a taking of Lot E. The County argued
that the highest and best use of Lot E was as an auxiliary holding
to Lot F—which, of course, is the current state of affairs. Both lots
are owned by the Murrs, and they have a variety of options for
developing the two lots together. But it does not appear that the

85. Brief of Amici Curiae National Ass’n of Counties in Support of Respondents, Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 3383223, at *5–10.
86. Murr, 332 Wis. 2d at 184, 796 N.W. 2d at 844.
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Wisconsin courts made a specific finding to this effect. The Supreme
Court suggested that the reduction in value was on the order of ten
percent, but this appears to be based on the assumption that Lots
E and F should be treated as merged into a single parcel.87 The
relevant question in determining the diminution in value, assuming
Lot E was a separate parcel, required more precisely focused evidence,
on remand. What was required was a finding of what Lot E would
fetch if it could be sold without restriction versus its value as an
auxiliary holding to Lot F. The relevant diminution in value, which
we will never know, was almost certainly not great enough to establish a taking under the Lucas version of the numerator/denominator
test, which requires a complete elimination of beneficial value. What
it would mean under the Penn Central version of regulatory takings
doctrine is, as always, deeply uncertain.
CONCLUSION
To summarize briefly, the horizontal dimensions of “the parcel as
a whole” should be determined under a thin federal-patterning definition. That definition, as previous decisions have established,
prohibits conceptual severance. It should also permit courts to disregard established lot lines if they have been adopted in an effort to
manipulate the regulatory takings inquiry. Otherwise, the horizontal dimensions of the parcel should be determined by the way lot
lines have been configured under state law. In the Murr case, it was
unclear whether Wisconsin law would treat the Murrs’ two lots as
separate parcels or as a single, merged parcel. The case should have
been remanded to the Wisconsin courts for an answer. Even if Lot
E standing alone is the relevant parcel, it is far from clear that the
minimum-lot-size requirement was a taking, since the lot still had
significant value in its current or possible future use in conjunction
with Lot F.
Nothing I have said in this Article about the proper approach to
defining the denominator should be taken as an endorsement of the
diminution-in-value approach to regulatory takings. If anything, the
87. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941 (citing the Wisconsin Circuit Court decision, Murr, 332 Wis.
2d, at 177–78, 184–85, 796 N.W. 2d, at 841, 844).
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hash the Court made of this question in Murr strongly supports the
conclusion that diminution in value is the wrong test for identifying
regulations that should be regarded as a taking requiring just
compensation. Here, as elsewhere, the path-dependent nature of the
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has led the Court to burrow
deeper and deeper into a hole that should not have been dug in the
first place. But that is a topic for another day.88 My point here is
that the choice between state and federal law is inevitable given the
nature of the right created by the Takings Clause. And the Court
would be well served by giving more thought to the possibility of
intermediate solutions, such as the federal-patterning definition,
before federalizing bits and pieces of doctrine in this area.

88. For a condensed version of my own thoughts on this score, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Supreme Court’s Regulatory Takings Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law Constitutionalism, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 28–32 (2018).

